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Does water kill directly like fire, or only indirectly by preventing breathing? The shiur distinguishes between mizik (damage) where water acts like fire versus misah (death) where water is merely grama, resolving questions about koach sheini liability. The second half analyzes eidim zomemim—are they paying for an avla against beis din or tashlumin nezikin to the victim?—and reconciles Tosafos (תוספות)' position that ka'asher zamam requires a victim to create a din of nezikin.
This advanced shiur on Bava Kamma 4b opens by examining the Gaon's assertion that the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s din of maveh (water damage) in Hilchos Chovel Umazik derives from Hilchos Retzicha perek 3 halacha (הלכה) 13. The Rambam there requires tying up the victim and placing him where water will drown him. Rabbi Zweig asks: if that's the source, shouldn't the same requirement apply to nezikin—that you must physically move the object into the water's path? The Gaon's position seems difficult. The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: by esh (fire), the fire itself is the maymis (killer)—it consumes and burns the person directly. By mayim (water), however, the water is never the direct killer; it only acts as a grama, stopping the victim from breathing. Therefore, koach acher me'ur bo (a second force moving the killer to a new location) works differently in the two cases. With fire, since you created an actual killer, you remain liable wherever it travels. With water, you haven't created a killer but merely put someone in a situation where they cannot breathe. Consequently, kayeich sheini (the second place the water reaches) should exempt you, unlike with fire where ruach metzuyah would still hold you liable.
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Bava Kamma 4b
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