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Why is the word "aleha" needed in the pasuk of yibum? The shiur explores whether ase docheh lo taaseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative one) applies to yibum, analyzing how the Gemara (גמרא) derives from "aleha" that without it, yibum might be permitted even when the yevama is an achos isha. The discussion touches on whether the mitzvah (מצוה) of yibum creates kiddushin or merely permits living together.
This shiur is an introduction to the opening Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 2a, focusing on fundamental questions about the nature of yibum and the principle of ase docheh lo taaseh she'yesh bo kares (whether a positive commandment overrides a negative prohibition punishable by kares). The Gemara asks several foundational questions based on the seemingly extra word "aleha" in the pasuk discussing yibum. The central kashas are: (1) Why does the Torah (תורה) need to write "aleha"? From the fact that this word is needed, we can infer that without it, the yevama would be mutar (permitted) to the yavam. But why should she be mutar without this word? (2) Why don't we say that the ase of yibum should push aside the lo taaseh of achos isha? (3) If there's a mitzvah (מצוה) of yibum but the woman is forbidden due to achos isha, shouldn't there at least be a requirement of chalitzah? (4) How do we know that the tzarah of an achos isha is also forbidden, and not just the ervah herself?
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Kiddushin 2a
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