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Does zechiyah (acquiring for another) work through shlichus (agency), or are they separate concepts? Tosafos (תוספות) offers two approaches to resolve why minors can benefit from zechiyah despite lacking capacity for shlichus. The analysis reveals whether agency requires formal appointment or merely assumed consent.
This shiur examines a fundamental dispute in Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the relationship between zechiyah (acquiring something on behalf of another person) and shlichus (agency). The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that one can be zocheh (acquire) on behalf of another in their absence, but the underlying mechanism is debated. Tosafos begins by citing the principle that zechiyah works through shlichus - when someone acquires on another's behalf, it functions as if that person appointed them as an agent, based on the assumption (umdena) that they would want to make such an appointment. This is supported by the Gemara in Bava Metzia regarding chatzer (courtyards) acquiring on behalf of their owners through a form of agency.
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Kesubos 11a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
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When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
