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When you give someone a gift on condition they return it (matana al menas lehachzir), are they truly owners? The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 6b asks why such a gift works for redeeming an esrog but not for selling land or effecting marriage. The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: conditional ownership may establish you're not a borrower, but it may lack the reciprocal obligation-generating power needed for kinyan kesef.
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 6b regarding the status of matana al menas lehachzir (a gift given on condition that it be returned). The Gemara presents a fundamental question: if such a conditional gift is not considered a valid gift (lo shmei matana), why does it work for certain purposes like esrog but not for others like mecher (sale of land), kiddushin (marriage), or pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn)? The shiur presents a foundational distinction between two aspects of ownership in matana al menas lehachzir. The first question is whether the recipient is genuinely an owner of the object or merely a shomer (guardian/borrower). If matana al menas lehachzir is shmei matana (considered a valid gift), the recipient is an owner; if lo shmei matana, they are merely a borrower. This distinction is critical for laws requiring ownership versus mere possession.
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Kiddushin 6b
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