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Why doesn't kedushah spread from half a woman to make the entire kiddushin valid, as it does with korbanot? The Gemara (גמרא) explains that daas acheres - the woman's consent - blocks the spreading since she only agreed to partial kiddushin. The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: is hispachdus an inherent property of kedushah itself, or a din in hilchos amira about how we interpret partial declarations?
The shiur explores a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 7a addressing the principle of hispachdus (spreading) in matters of kedushah. The Gemara establishes that when one attempts to sanctify half a woman (chatzi isha), it is not a valid kiddushin. The question arises: why doesn't the kedushah spread to encompass the entire woman, similar to the halacha (הלכה) by korbanot where designating part of an animal as an olah causes the kedushah to spread to the entire animal? The Gemara's answer focuses on the concept of daas acheres - there is another party (the woman) whose consent matters. Unlike a behemah which belongs entirely to its owner, by kiddushin there are two parties involved, and since the woman doesn't want the kedushah to spread beyond what she agreed to, the spreading cannot occur.
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Kiddushin 7a
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