A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why are two sets of witnesses needed for theft and slaughter in arvah v'chamisha? The Gemara (גמרא) contrasts the relationship between geneiva and tevichah with kiddushin and bi'ah to resolve whether this violates Rabbi Akiva's principle of dover v'lo echad si dover. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) differ on the proof case, revealing different models of testimonial independence.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 60a regarding the principle of dover v'lo echad si dover (testifying about something and half of something) as it applies to the obligation of arba v'chamisha (fourfold or fivefold payment) for stealing and slaughtering an animal. The Mishna establishes that one who steals and slaughters (ganav u'tovach) is liable for arba v'chamisha, raising the question of whether two sets of witnesses—one testifying on the theft and another on the slaughter—can combine their testimonies, or whether this violates Rabbi Akiva's principle that you cannot have partial testimony creating liability. Rabbi Zweig analyzes several cases in the Mishna, including ganav u'tovach l'refuah o l'klavim (slaughtering for medicinal purposes or for dogs), where one is still liable for arba v'chamisha. He explores what the chiddush of this din might be, suggesting it may relate to the Yam Shel Shlomo's principle that slaughtering with intent that the meat should not be permissible (shechitah she'einah ro'uyah) renders it forbidden. The Mishna teaches that as long as one could theoretically eat the meat, even if one doesn't intend to, the slaughter is valid and one is liable.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 60a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
