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Why doesn't Syria (Aram Naharayim and Aram Tzova), conquered by Dovid HaMelech, have full kedushah of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the principle of kibush yachid lo shemo kibush—an individual conquest doesn't count. The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on what constitutes kibush yachid, the Ramban (רמב"ן)'s requirement to conquer lands in order, and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that Syria has an intermediate status—neither Eretz Yisrael nor fully chutz la'aretz.
This shiur examines a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 8a dealing with the halachic status of Syria (Aram Naharayim and Aram Tzova), lands conquered by Dovid HaMelech. The central question is: why do these conquered territories not have the full kedushah (sanctity) of Eretz Yisrael, despite being captured by a Jewish king? The Gemara introduces the principle of "kibush yachid lo shemo kibush"—a conquest by an individual (or limited group) is not considered a proper conquest that confers the full status of Eretz Yisrael. The shiur presents a detailed analysis of what exactly disqualifies Dovid's conquest. Rashi (רש"י) explains that it was a "kibush yachid" because it was done by the king for his own needs (l'tzorcho), not for the needs of all Israel (l'tzorach kol Yisrael), and it was not done with all of Israel together (sh'lo hayu kol Yisrael b'yachad), unlike Yehoshua's conquest which involved all the tribes.
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Gittin 8a
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