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Why doesn't a nidah make her co-wife exempt from yibum, just like achos isha does? The shiur unpacks Tosfot's question: both are in a hekesh, yet only achos isha creates an "exclusion" (neser le'olam) rather than a temporary issur. The distinction hinges on whether the ervah is inherent to the relationship or merely a passing state, with major nafka mina for chalitza.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur delves into a foundational Tosfot on Yevamos 2a concerning the halachic status of a nidah in the framework of yibum. The central question posed by Tosfot is: why does a nidah not exempt her co-wife (tzara) from yibum the way achos isha does? Both are listed among the arayos in a hekesh, and both render the yavam unable to perform yibum at the time the husband dies. Yet our Mishna makes clear that a nidah does *not* patur her tzara, while achos isha does. Tosfot's inquiry thus probes the conceptual difference between these two prohibitions. Rabbi Zweig begins by questioning whether Tosfot's kasha is even appropriately placed here. The Mishna on daf beis amud alef does not itself say that achos isha is neser le'olam; that fact emerges only later (around daf lamed). If so, how can Tosfot assume at this early stage that achos isha creates a permanent exclusion and then ask why nidah does not do the same? The shiur suggests that Tosfot is articulating a fundamental axiom: *only* when a woman is excluded from yibum (i.e., the zika is severed entirely, not merely obstructed) can she patur her tzara. The proof that she is excluded comes from the fact that her tzara goes free—ervah poter et tzarah. Thus, Tosfot infers backward from the Mishna's silence on nidah that nidah is *not* excluded, and then asks: why not?
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Yevamos 2a
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