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Why isn't kiddushin through arvach lezman (expediting a father's obligation) considered ribbis? The Gemara (גמרא) examines whether the woman is "giving" the man a peruta's value by forgoing what he owes her. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot differ on whether kiddushin money represents payment for actual value or merely fulfills a technical requirement, which determines if ribbis applies.
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion on Kiddushin 6b regarding whether a man can be mekadesh a woman through arvach lezman—by expediting a financial obligation her father owes him. The central question is whether this constitutes ribbis (interest), since the man appears to be receiving value (the expedited payment) in exchange for the kiddushin. The Gemara presents the case where a father owes a man money, and the man agrees to be marbitz lizman (expedite or forgo the obligation) in exchange for marrying the daughter. This raises the question: since the man would normally have to pay someone a peruta to handle such a transaction, and now he's getting this service for free through the kiddushin, isn't he effectively receiving ribbis—getting value from the woman beyond the pure kiddushin transaction?
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Kiddushin 6b
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