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Does kiddushin require only a valid kinyan (transaction), or must the woman also want to designate herself to the man? The shiur develops that kiddushin involves two distinct elements: hilchos kinyanim (where coercion can still create a valid transaction) and a separate halacha (הלכה) that the woman must want him—asur la'kuli alma k'hekdesh. This framework resolves contradictions in Rashi (רש"י) and explains why shotgun marriages work differently for men and women.
This shiur on Kiddushin 2b analyzes a fundamental dispute among Rishonim regarding whether a woman can be mekudeshes ba'al korcha (against her will). The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the concept through the sugya of taluy v'zaven (conditional on sale) and taluy v'koneh (conditional on acquisition), exploring whether coercion invalidates kiddushin. The Rajva holds that just as taluy v'koneh works in monetary transactions, it should certainly work for kiddushin. The Gemara's discussion of afkinu rabbanan kiddushin (the Rabbis uprooted the kiddushin) applies only to the woman forcing the man, not vice versa. The Ba'alei Tosafos (תוספות), however, maintain that if taluy v'koneh doesn't work, certainly taluy v'zaven doesn't work—therefore a man cannot be forced into kiddushin either. The Smag offers a third approach: taluy v'zaven definitely doesn't work (a woman cannot be forced), but taluy v'koneh is subject to the Gemara's debate about whether afkinu rabbanan kiddushin applies.
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Kiddushin 2b
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Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
