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Can two brothers betroth two women using one peruta through a shared agent? The Gemara (גמרא)'s case of "shnei bnos ach li'shnei banav" reveals a fundamental distinction: kiddushin creates a ma'aseh kedusha that can be shared, unlike kinyan kesef which requires a property exchange. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot disagree whether the agent's status (katana vs. gedola) changes the analysis.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 7b's discussion of whether two brothers can betroth two women using a single peruta through their father acting as an agent. The Gemara (גמרא) presents the case of "shnei bnos ach li'shnei banav b'pruta"—two sisters to two brothers with one peruta—and asks whether we follow "boser nosen hamekabel al azlinan" (we follow the giver who receives) or whether the dual nature of the transaction invalidates it. Rashi (רש"י) explains that the case involves two adult sons (gedolim) appointing their father as an agent to betroth two women. The question is whether one peruta suffices because we follow "boser mekabel" (the recipients), or whether it fails because two separate acts of kiddushin require two perutot. Tosafot disagrees fundamentally with Rashi's setup. According to Tosafot, the case must involve the father acting on behalf of his minor daughters (ketanot), where he has inherent authority. For adult daughters being betrothed by adult sons through an agent, Tosafot argues that "boser nosen" cannot be "lav davka"—you cannot dismiss the requirement that each giver needs to provide a full peruta, since an agent cannot combine two principals' obligations.
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Kiddushin 7b
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