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Why does a lulav that became unbound on Yom Tov remain invalid even after retying? The shiur explores whether the invalidation (dechui) is from the binding itself creating a mitzvah (מצוה) object, or from the act of taking. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree fundamentally on when the din of dechui takes effect—on Erev Yom Tov when bound, or only on Yom Tov itself.
The Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah 33a discusses a case of "avar v'liktun"—where one bound the four species and then unbound them. The Tanna Kamma holds this invalidates the lulav, while the Chachamim permit it. The shiur analyzes the fundamental machlokes underlying this dispute. The first possibility in the Gemara is that everyone agrees lulav requires binding (lulav tzarich agud), and they disagree whether we apply a binyan av from sukkah to lulav. The principle of "dichui etzal mitzvos" would mean that once an object is disqualified for a mitzvah (מצוה) (when Yom Tov arrives while the species are unbound), it remains disqualified even after correction. The Tanna Kamma holds we learn this from sukkah (yilfinun lulav mi'sukkah), creating a din of asiya (an act that creates the mitzvah object), while the Chachamim hold we don't learn this binyan av (lo yilfinun).
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Sukkah 33a
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