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When a ganav steals a thin animal that fattens up and then breaks it, why is that a second act of gezela? Rashi (רש"י) holds that breaking can only constitute a new meisig gezela if it continues the original theft—you can only "re-steal" what you originally stole. This generates a kasha: by kusha v'hishemena, why isn't the ganav mechuyav for mazik on the increased value he destroyed?
This shiur on Bava Kamma 65a analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation of tavra v'shasia—when a ganav steals an object worth one and it appreciates to four, then breaks it, he is chayav to pay four because the breaking constitutes a second act of gezela. The central question is: why does Rashi need to emphasize that the increased value is "b'reshus ha'baalim" (in the domain of the owner)? The object clearly belongs to the victim; what additional chiddush does Rashi provide by stressing it remains in his reshus? The shiur explores a fundamental tension: normally, when something is stolen and increases in value outside the victim's physical possession, one might think the increase is not subject to the din of gunav mi'beis ish—it wasn't "stolen from the owner's house" since the appreciation occurred while already in the ganav's hands. Rashi counters that because the ganav must return the object (chiyuv chazara), it is still considered b'reshus ha'baalim. Therefore, when he breaks it, that constitutes a new act of gezela on the appreciated value.
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Bava Kamma 65a
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