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Does kiddushin create exclusive ownership rights or merely establish prohibitions? The shiur analyzes a machloket between the Pnei Yeshurun and Avnei Miluim to argue that kiddushin has two distinct components: kinyan (acquisition) and issur (prohibition). This dual structure explains why the Gemara (גמרא) needs a hekesh to prevent second kiddushin from creating issurim even when the kinyan aspect fails.
This shiur examines the fundamental nature of kiddushin by analyzing the Mishna's statement that "a woman is acquired (niknes) in three ways." Rabbi Zweig begins by exploring Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary that explains niknes as the woman being acquired to her husband, creating exclusive rights that prevent her from marrying another. The Ra'ah and Meiri support this understanding, with the Meiri stating that once acquired, "no one else can be zocheh in her." The discussion then delves into a fundamental machloket between the Pnei Yeshurun and Avnei Miluim regarding whether the first husband's kiddushin prevents a second person's kiddushin from taking effect. The Beit Shmuel holds that in cases of chatzi shifcha chatzi bat chorin (half-slave, half-free woman), if two people attempt kiddushin, only the first is effective because the second constitutes kiddushin with an eishes ish (married woman). However, the Avnei Miluim challenges this based on a Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin that requires a hekesh (textual comparison) to teach that kiddushin doesn't work with eishes ish, suggesting it's not simply a logical svara about prior ownership.
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Kiddushin 2a
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