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If witnesses testify on both theft (geneiva) and slaughter/sale (tvicha mechira) and are later impeached (hazamah), when are they liable? The Gemara (גמרא) asks: if you impeach them first on the geneiva, they're pasul from that time—so how can they pay for tvicha? And if on tvicha first, once you impeach them on geneiva afterward, they're retroactively pasul—again, how do they pay? The shiur resolves this through the Gemara's answer that they testified b'vas achas (as one eidus), and explores the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s unique reading that this means a single psak bezdin—not necessarily toch kedei dibur—making their entire testimony one unified act whose hazamah occurs only at its conclusion.
This shiur presents an intricate analysis of Bava Kamma 73a, focusing on the law of eidim zomemim (impeached witnesses) in the context of paying arba v'chamisha (fourfold/fivefold restitution for stolen animals that are slaughtered or sold). The Mishna states that if two witnesses testify that someone stole and slaughtered or sold an ox or sheep, and the witnesses are later impeached, they must pay the full amount (dalet hei). The Gemara (גמרא) immediately raises a difficulty based on the principle that eid zomem l'mafrei hu nifsal—an impeached witness is disqualified retroactively from the time of the original testimony. The Gemara's first question is: if the witnesses were impeached on the geneiva (theft) first, they become pasul from that moment. This means that when they later testified about the tvicha mechira (slaughter/sale), they were already disqualified witnesses (eidim psulim). Since their testimony on tvicha was invalid, how can they possibly be liable to pay for it? The Gemara then considers the reverse scenario: what if they were impeached on the tvicha mechira first? In that case, they would initially be liable for the tvicha. But once they are subsequently impeached on the geneiva, we now know retroactively that they were pasul from the time of the geneiva testimony. This should retroactively invalidate the tvicha testimony as well, because ein geneiva ein tvicha mechira—without theft, there is no liability for slaughter or sale. So again, why should they have to pay?
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Bava Kamma 73a
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