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What is the nature of a mashkon (collateral)? The shiur contrasts two fundamental approaches: Rashi (רש"י) views mashkon solely as pressure to ensure repayment, while Rashba, Ramban (רמב"ן), and Ritva view it as the beginning of collection itself—an achizah in the debt. This machloket determines whether giving a mashkon can create a binding obligation even without an existing debt.
This shiur presents a fundamental machloket among the Rishonim regarding the nature of mashkon (collateral) and its ability to create obligations. The starting point is whether giving a mashkon can create a binding commitment when there is no pre-existing debt. Rashi (רש"י) holds that a mashkon cannot create an obligation on oneself, while the Rashba, Ramban (רמב"ן), and Ritva hold that it can. The shiur develops two fundamentally different understandings of what mashkon is. According to one approach (attributed to Rashi), a mashkon is merely a tool to pressure the borrower to repay. The lender has the right to hold onto something to ensure that the borrower feels pressured to fulfill his obligation. The right to hold the mashkon exists solely to create this pressure. According to the second approach (the Rashba, Ramban, and Ritva), mashkon is not merely about pressure but represents the beginning of collection (techilat geviyah). The lender holding the mashkon has an achizah—a partial ownership or kinyan—in the debt itself. The right to hold the mashkon stems from the lender's right to collect from this object.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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