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The Gemara (גמרא) asks whether kiddushin through biah takes effect at the beginning (techilas biah) or completion (sof biah) of the act. The shiur shows this question is not about the minimum act required, but whether the kinyan works retroactively from the start once completed. Understanding this resolves apparent contradictions between our sugya and Yevamos regarding haraah.
This shiur analyzes the complex sugya in Kiddushin 10a discussing whether kiddushin through biah is established at techilas biah (the beginning of the act) or sof biah (its completion). Rabbi Zweig identifies several fundamental difficulties with the Gemara (גמרא)'s structure: the lack of clear tzadim (reasoning) for either position, the absence of any apparent shailah given that haraah is considered biah throughout Torah (תורה), and why Tosafos (תוספות) only raises his question on the Gemara's maskana rather than at the outset. The shiur presents a close reading of Rashi (רש"י) that raises significant challenges. Rashi limits the discussion to erusin, and the language "shelo leshem kiddushin" appears puzzling when discussing a kohen gadol who cannot marry a be'ulah. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that Rashi in Yevamos explicitly holds that haraah creates kiddushin, making the apparent contradiction more acute.
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Kiddushin 10a
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