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Who is liable when a dog picks up a coal and ignites a fire—the owner of the coal or the owner of the dog? The shiur develops an innovative reading of Tosfos: transforming a coal into a flame creates a new object, making the transformer (here, the dog's owner) the baal ha'eish. This principle explains Reish Lakish's requirement of "shalheives" and reshapes the boundary between direct and indirect causation.
Rabbi Zweig analyzes a complex Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma 22a, focusing on an extremely difficult Tosfos that seems to be misplaced or misunderstood. The fundamental question is: when a dog takes a coal (gacheles) and creates a fire that causes damage, who is liable—the owner of the original coal (baal hagacheles) or the owner of the dog (baal hakelev)? The Gemara discusses Reish Lakish's principle that one is only liable for fire damage when one gives over a "shalheives" (flame), not merely a "gacheles" (coal). The shiur notes that many Acharonim, cited in the "Green Book," suggest this Tosfos actually belongs on daf 23a, where the Gemara asks why the baal hagacheles should be liable. However, Rabbi Zweig is unsatisfied with this explanation, noting that the Rishonim (Maharshal, Maharam, Rashash) don't address this seeming displacement, suggesting there must be a proper understanding that fits the Tosfos in its current location.
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Bava Kamma 22a
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