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What does *modeh b'knas patur* actually accomplish—does it simply mean you cannot obligate yourself, or does confession itself create a genuine exemption? The shiur develops a fundamental *chakira*: whether *hodaah* removes past liability (the action's obligation) or merely blocks future punishment, and shows how this question drives the entire *machlokes* between the Ramban (רמב"ן), Raavad, Chazon Ish, and Rashi (רש"י) on the function of admission in monetary penalties.
This shiur on Bava Kamma 65a centers on the mechanism and scope of *modeh b'knas patur*—the principle that one who confesses to a monetary penalty (*knas*) is exempt. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction between two ways of understanding this exemption. The first approach, associated with the Chazon Ish and possibly the Ramban (רמב"ן), holds that *modeh b'knas* means you simply lack the ability to obligate yourself in penalties through your own admission; it is a procedural limitation, not a substantive exemption. The second approach, drawn from Rashi (רש"י) and the Raavad, argues that *modeh b'knas* is itself a *patur*—a true exemption that removes liability for the past action. If witnesses later arrive, the exemption remains in place and prevents *beis din* from punishing you. The Gemara (גמרא)'s question—"*Eidecha patur*, isn't this obvious?"—is only sensible if we understand that the real *chiddush* is *modeh b'knas*. But why does the Gemara need to teach *modeh b'knas* through *eidecha*? The shiur explains that the Gemara's structure reveals a deeper layer: *modeh b'knas* doesn't merely block self-incrimination; it creates an actual *patur*. Once you confess in *beis din*, the court has already adjudicated the facts. When witnesses come later, *beis din* cannot revisit the same case—this is the principle of *him motzi ki motzi b'eidim*. The Torah (תורה) allows punishment only when *beis din* first hears the facts through witnesses, not when it has already ruled on the matter based on a confession.
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Bava Kamma 65a
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