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Why can't beis din execute judgment on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur develops the Mogen Avrohom's reading of the Rambam (רמב"ם) that it's not a hilul Shabbos issue—beis din simply has no mitzvah (מצוה) to adjudicate on Shabbos. The analysis integrates the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of ba'al hamachteres and rodef, demonstrating that this yesod resolves major difficulties in the sugya and explains the Mishna's safek on Shabbos cases.
This shiur examines the fundamental question of why beis din cannot execute judgment on Shabbos (שבת), analyzing the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position as explained by the Mogen Avrohom. The central thesis challenges the assumption that the prohibition stems from hilul Shabbos concerns, proposing instead that beis din simply lacks the authority to adjudicate on Shabbos—it is not a time when beis din functions. The shiur begins by presenting the Mogen Avrohom's understanding that the Rambam learned the prohibition not as an issur of hilul Shabbos, but as a din that beis din cannot be dan on Shabbos. This reading offers significant advantages in understanding the Gemara (גמרא)'s flow. According to this approach, the hava amina of the Gemara was that beis din could be ma'anish on Shabbos under the principle of eser docheh lo sa'aseh. The Gemara's kasha is not that eser is not docheh lo sa'aseh, but rather that on Shabbos there is no eser at all—because beis din does not have a mitzvah (מצוה) to be dan on Shabbos.
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Yevamos 6a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
