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Why can't beis din execute judgment on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur develops the Mogen Avrohom's reading of the Rambam (רמב"ם) that it's not a hilul Shabbos issue—beis din simply has no mitzvah (מצוה) to adjudicate on Shabbos. The analysis integrates the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of ba'al hamachteres and rodef, demonstrating that this yesod resolves major difficulties in the sugya and explains the Mishna's safek on Shabbos cases.
This shiur examines the fundamental question of why beis din cannot execute judgment on Shabbos (שבת), analyzing the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position as explained by the Mogen Avrohom. The central thesis challenges the assumption that the prohibition stems from hilul Shabbos concerns, proposing instead that beis din simply lacks the authority to adjudicate on Shabbos—it is not a time when beis din functions. The shiur begins by presenting the Mogen Avrohom's understanding that the Rambam learned the prohibition not as an issur of hilul Shabbos, but as a din that beis din cannot be dan on Shabbos. This reading offers significant advantages in understanding the Gemara (גמרא)'s flow. According to this approach, the hava amina of the Gemara was that beis din could be ma'anish on Shabbos under the principle of eser docheh lo sa'aseh. The Gemara's kasha is not that eser is not docheh lo sa'aseh, but rather that on Shabbos there is no eser at all—because beis din does not have a mitzvah (מצוה) to be dan on Shabbos.
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Yevamos 6a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
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Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
