No community start suggestion yet.
Does biah (marital relations) effect kiddushin at its beginning (techilas biah) or its completion (sof biah)? The shiur works through multiple approaches in Tosafos (תוספות)—whether it depends on intent, differs between erusin and nisuin, or varies across different halachic contexts. The Ran's position that yibum differs from standard kiddushin leads to complex questions about the relationship between intention and kinyan.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental question in Kiddushin 10a regarding when biah (marital relations) effects the kinyan of kiddushin: at the beginning (techilas biah) or at the completion (sof biah). The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion creates an apparent contradiction with the sugya in Yevamos, which seems to indicate that techilas biah is sufficient for kinyan by a yevamah. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining practical nafka minas (practical differences) between the two positions. He questions the Shulchan Aruch's case where in the middle of biah she accepts kiddushin from someone else, suggesting a more likely scenario: if the man dies during biah, does the woman need chalitzah? If techilas biah is koneh, she would be considered his wife and need chalitzah; if sof biah is required, she remains a penuyah.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 10a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
