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When a husband throws a get that lands partially in his daled amos and partially in hers, why isn't she divorced? The shiur develops the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between arba amos shelo (one person's space) and arba amos shenayim (shared space). A fundamental chiddush emerges: partial presence of the get in her space would normally suffice for divorce, but his simultaneous ownership in that space blocks the kinyan.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gittin 78b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of when a get (bill of divorce) is valid based on where it lands relative to the daled amos (four cubits) of the husband and wife. The central question is understanding the distinction between a case where the get lands in "arba amos shelo" (within the wife's four amos but also touching the husband's space) versus "arba amos shenayim" (in a space shared equally by both parties). Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing that when the Gemara says a get landing in arba amos shelo is invalid, this must mean something beyond the simple case of the get being completely outside her space. The reisha of the Mishna already taught that basic rule. Therefore, the Gemara must be teaching that even when the get IS within her arba amos, if it's also within his arba amos (arba amos shelo), she is not divorced. This leads to a fundamental chiddush: normally, having even part of the get within her daled amos would be sufficient for a valid divorce, but when part of the get simultaneously remains in his space, the kinyan fails.
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Gittin 78b
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