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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman by saying "I'm being mekadesh you with a loan (mone)" and giving her collateral (mashkin)? Rashi (רש"י) holds there is no obligation at all, while Tosfos maintains the obligation exists but isn't considered "here" (ein kan) for kedushin purposes. The shiur wrestles with how Tosfos can then distinguish between one's own mashkin versus mashkin d'acher (collateral from a third party).
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of Kiddushin 8a-b, focusing on the sugya of kedushin with mone (a loan obligation) and mashkin (collateral). The central case is where a man says to a woman "Be mekudeshes to me with a mone" and gives her a mashkin—the Gemara (גמרא) rules she is not mekudeshes. Rabbi Zweig systematically builds the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on why this kedushin fails. According to Rashi, "mone ein kan, mashkin ein kan" means there is no mone (obligation) whatsoever. Since the man has not created any legal obligation to pay the woman, the mashkin he gives her has no significance—it's merely a meaningless object transfer because there's no underlying debt to secure. The mashkin only has meaning when there's a pre-existing obligation, and here there is none. Therefore, she's not mekudeshes because no actual value has been transferred.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
