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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman by saying "I'm being mekadesh you with a loan (mone)" and giving her collateral (mashkin)? Rashi (רש"י) holds there is no obligation at all, while Tosfos maintains the obligation exists but isn't considered "here" (ein kan) for kedushin purposes. The shiur wrestles with how Tosfos can then distinguish between one's own mashkin versus mashkin d'acher (collateral from a third party).
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of Kiddushin 8a-b, focusing on the sugya of kedushin with mone (a loan obligation) and mashkin (collateral). The central case is where a man says to a woman "Be mekudeshes to me with a mone" and gives her a mashkin—the Gemara (גמרא) rules she is not mekudeshes. Rabbi Zweig systematically builds the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on why this kedushin fails. According to Rashi, "mone ein kan, mashkin ein kan" means there is no mone (obligation) whatsoever. Since the man has not created any legal obligation to pay the woman, the mashkin he gives her has no significance—it's merely a meaningless object transfer because there's no underlying debt to secure. The mashkin only has meaning when there's a pre-existing obligation, and here there is none. Therefore, she's not mekudeshes because no actual value has been transferred.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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