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When you give a gift "on condition to return it" (matana al menas l'hachzir), does the recipient truly acquire it despite having to give it back? The shiur develops the fundamental chakira between ownership and value: the Rosh holds the recipient must actively transfer it back—meaning he genuinely owns it and chooses to return it. The seeming deficiency is in his decision-making, not his ownership.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental concept of matana al menas l'hachzir (a gift given on condition to return it) on Kiddushin 2b. The Gemara (גמרא) raises the question: how can such a conditional gift effect kiddushin (betrothal through monetary transfer) when the woman receives no real value since she must return the object? Rabbi Zweig frames two possible ways to understand why matana al menas l'hachzir is not considered a valid gift: (1) the recipient lacks technical ownership, or (2) the recipient has technical ownership but receives no value. The Gemara's proof from esrog (where such a gift is valid for the mitzvah (מצוה)) suggests that technical ownership alone suffices, but this raises a fundamental question: for kiddushin, which requires monetary transfer of value, shouldn't the lack of value itself disqualify such a gift?
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Kiddushin 2b
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