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Why does the Torah (תורה) need a special verse to equate shevel kesef (non-cash items of value) with kesef (silver) in marriage, pidyon eved ivri, and damages? Tosfos understands that subjective value is not inherently halachic value; it works through a kinyan or because it can be converted to cash. The shiur traces the Rashba-Rambam (רמב"ם) dispute on whether a kli she'aino shaveh pruta is valid for kiddushin, contrasts the din by moda'ah bemiksas, and analyzes whether forced marriage (bal korcho) constitutes a kinyan at all.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question: Why does the Torah (תורה) need a pasuk (verse) to teach that shevel kesef (items of value, not silver currency) can function as kesef (silver) in halachic transactions? The problem, as Tosfos understands it, is that "value" is inherently subjective—it fluctuates with supply and demand, time, and place. Halacha (הלכה) requires an absolute standard. Kesef can mean either a specific weight of silver or currency; both are objective. But shevel kesef—subjective value—appears insufficient. Yet the Torah teaches in the case of eved ivri (Hebrew slave) that shevel kesef functions as kesef. Tosfos explains that this does not mean subjective value is considered absolute; rather, it means that since shevel kesef can be converted to kesef, the Torah permits its use. The Torah does not invest subjective value with intrinsic worth—it simply recognizes that the object can be exchanged for silver, making the transaction functionally equivalent. This leads to a key distinction. Tosfos proposes two sources for the din: eved ivri and nezikin (damages). The case of eved ivri is a ma'aseh kinyan—a formal ritual act that changes a person's halachic status. The case of nezikin is payment—tashlumim. If shevel kesef is learned from eved ivri, it works as a kinyan and requires an object that can be readily converted. If learned from nezikin, it would imply that subjective value itself has worth. Tosfos explains that kiddushin (marriage) is also a kinyan, not a payment; therefore, it can only be derived from eved ivri. One cannot derive kiddushin from nezikin because nezikin requires meitav (the best quality), and kiddushin requires a kinyan act—an object that embodies the act itself, not just value.
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Kiddushin 2b
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