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When is someone liable under techillas b'peshia v'sof b'oness (beginning with negligence, ending with unavoidable accident)? The shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 21b's wall case to develop a fundamental principle: negligence must exist at the precise moment the damage occurs. If the negligent act would only have caused damage minutes later, but the actual damage happens earlier through oness, there is no liability—the peshia and the hezek must temporally align.
This shiur continues yesterday's discussion by examining the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of reshus hamazik (the domain of the damager) and develops a fundamental principle about techillas b'peshia v'sof b'oness (beginning with negligence, ending with unavoidable accident). Rabbi Zweig opens by analyzing Rambam Hilchos Nizkei Mamon 1:7, which states that if an animal enters the reshus hamazik and is damaged by the property owner's animal, the owner is patur (exempt). The Rambam cites the pasuk "v'shilach es be'iro" (and he sends forth his animal) to establish that the mazik must go to the nezik, not the other way around. This raises two difficulties. First, this pasuk appears by shor and regel, not by keren—how can the Rambam use it as a marker for keren? Second, and more fundamentally, the Gemara (גמרא) yesterday established that this pasuk is needed to patur shen v'regel in reshus hamazik; according to the Gemara's havamina, keren would have been chayav in reshus hamazik. How then can the Rambam cite this pasuk to patur keren?
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Bava Kamma 21b
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
