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How can Chachamim retroactively annul a marriage when they lack authority over the actual kiddushin? The shiur develops Rashi (רש"י)'s two-step mechanism: the get cancels the kinyan going forward, then Chachamim retroactively void the ishus relationship itself.
This shiur analyzes the complex mechanics of 'afkainan kidushin' (we annul the kiddushin) as explained by Rashi (רש"י) on Kesubos 3a. The central question is how the Chachamim can retroactively invalidate a marriage when they don't have direct authority over the kiddushin itself. Rashi presents a sophisticated two-part process. First, the get works to cancel the kinyan (monetary acquisition) aspect of the marriage, but only going forward (mikan l'haba), not retroactively. This creates a situation where the woman is divorced according to Torah (תורה) law from that point forward. However, the ishus (marital relationship) component remains intact retroactively until the second step occurs.
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Kesubos 3a
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