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Why does the Mishna say "lo sei'achel" (it shall not be eaten) rather than "assur" (forbidden)? The shiur analyzes Tosafot's question and explores whether "assur" implies a permanent prohibition. It examines Rashi (רש"י)'s approach connecting muktzah to yotzei min hachai via the Chasam Sofer, and the Shagas Aryeh's principle that chatzi shiur only applies to retroactive prohibitions—which cannot work for ba'al yir'ah on Yom Tov.
The shiur opens on Beitzah 2a with a fundamental question raised by Tosafot: why does the Mishna regarding a beitzah shenoldah b'Yom Tov (an egg laid on a festival) use the language "lo sei'achel" (it shall not be eaten) instead of the more standard formulation "assur u'mutar" (forbidden and permitted)? Tosafot suggests that the word "assur" might imply a permanent prohibition (assur le'olam), whereas "lo sei'achel" specifically indicates the prohibition is limited to that day ("bo b'yom"). Rabbi Zweig examines Rashi (רש"י)'s position that "lo sei'achel" comes to teach "bo b'yom"—that the egg is forbidden only today, not forever. The Shitah Mekubetzes echoes this, explaining that without this language, one might think the egg remains forbidden permanently. The challenge is identifying what underlying issur could render an egg assur le'olam. Tosafot points out that in other contexts (such as the law of most hashem (ה׳) shenolad and efroch shenolad), the Mishna does use "assur," yet there too the prohibition is clearly only for that day, suggesting that "assur" need not imply permanence.
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Beitzah 2a
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