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Why does the death of the father release an amah ivriah from servitude to her master? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Rishonim on whether misas ha'av is logically justified. A novel approach suggests the father serves as legal guardian, and without him, no one trusted remains to protect her interests—making the continued servitude untenable.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur explores Kiddushin 4a, focusing on the principle that the death of the father (misas ha'av) releases an amah ivriah (Hebrew maidservant) from the authority of her master (adon). The Gemara attempts to derive this law through a kal vachomer: if simanim (physical signs of maturity) remove her from the master's domain but not from the father's, then the father's death—which removes her from the father's domain—should certainly remove her from the master's. The Gemara rejects this reasoning, stating "ma l'simanim sheken nishtana ha-guf"—simanim involve a physical change in the girl herself, whereas the father's death does not. Rabbi Zweig presents two major difficulties: (1) Mar bar Rav Ashi's statement that without a special verse, one could not sell an ailonis (a girl who will never develop simanim)—why would anyone think this prohibited? (2) The Gemara's need for a verse teaching that bagrus d'ailonis releases her from the master—why isn't it obvious that the father cannot sell what he doesn't own beyond her minority?
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Kiddushin 4a
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