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Can a coerced transaction be valid? The Gemara (גמרא) says "talu'i vezavin zvina zvina" (coerced sale works) but "talu'i vekone lo amru" (coerced acquisition doesn't). The shiur analyzes the machlokes between the Baal HaItur, Ravad, and Rambam (רמב"ם): Is saying "rotzani" under duress passive acquiescence, active agreement, or something in between? The answer transforms our understanding of kinyan kesef and kiddushin b'al korach.
This advanced shiur on Kiddushin 3a explores one of the Gemara (גמרא)'s most fundamental distinctions in kinyanim (acquisitions): the principle of "talu'i vezavin zvina zvina, talu'i vekone lo amru"—that coerced sales are valid but coerced acquisitions are not. The central question is: what is the conceptual difference between forcing someone to sell versus forcing someone to buy, and how does this apply to kiddushin (marriage)? The shiur begins with the Rajva's question on the Baal HaItur's position. The Baal HaItur holds that you can force someone to sell (talu'i vezavin) but not to buy (talu'i vekone). The Rajva asks a fundamental kal vachomer: making a haknah (transferring ownership) always requires greater legal capacity than making a kinyan (acquiring ownership)—a minor can be koneh but cannot be makneh. If coercion suffices for the harder act (haknah), shouldn't it certainly work for the easier act (kinyan)?
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Kiddushin 3a
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