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Can a coerced transaction be valid? The Gemara (גמרא) says "talu'i vezavin zvina zvina" (coerced sale works) but "talu'i vekone lo amru" (coerced acquisition doesn't). The shiur analyzes the machlokes between the Baal HaItur, Ravad, and Rambam (רמב"ם): Is saying "rotzani" under duress passive acquiescence, active agreement, or something in between? The answer transforms our understanding of kinyan kesef and kiddushin b'al korach.
This advanced shiur on Kiddushin 3a explores one of the Gemara (גמרא)'s most fundamental distinctions in kinyanim (acquisitions): the principle of "talu'i vezavin zvina zvina, talu'i vekone lo amru"—that coerced sales are valid but coerced acquisitions are not. The central question is: what is the conceptual difference between forcing someone to sell versus forcing someone to buy, and how does this apply to kiddushin (marriage)? The shiur begins with the Rajva's question on the Baal HaItur's position. The Baal HaItur holds that you can force someone to sell (talu'i vezavin) but not to buy (talu'i vekone). The Rajva asks a fundamental kal vachomer: making a haknah (transferring ownership) always requires greater legal capacity than making a kinyan (acquiring ownership)—a minor can be koneh but cannot be makneh. If coercion suffices for the harder act (haknah), shouldn't it certainly work for the easier act (kinyan)?
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Kiddushin 3a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
