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What makes an owner liable for his animal's damage—creating a dangerous situation or failing to guard once danger arose? The Gemara (גמרא) analyzes Keren (goring) versus Shen (eating) to determine whether liability stems from contributing to the hazard or from not preventing harm to the neighbor. The kal v'chomer reveals both factors are valid bases for obligation.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 3b-4a exploring the fundamental basis of an owner's liability for damages caused by his animal. The central question is whether the Torah (תורה) obligates the owner because he created a dangerous animal (mazik) through negligence, or because he failed to guard the animal once it became dangerous and thereby failed to protect his neighbor's property from harm. The Gemara (גמרא) presents an apparent contradiction in the Tosefta regarding which is easier to guard: Keren (goring/damage motivated by aggression without pleasure, kavanos l'hazik) or Shen (eating/damage motivated by pleasure, hanaa). Initially, the Tosefta states that Keren is easier to guard because one can prevent the animal from becoming agitated (kal yachol lishomro), while Shen is harder because the animal naturally becomes hungry (ones). But then the Tosefta reverses, stating that Shen is easier and Keren creates an ones situation. This seems contradictory—how can the same facts support opposite conclusions?
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Bava Kamma 3b-4a
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