No community start suggestion yet.
Can a man be mekadesh a woman by forgoing collection of a loan due, giving her extended time to repay? Rashi (רש"י) holds he is mekadesh her with the money she saves by not hiring someone else to negotiate an extension—a service fee, not ribbis. The Raavad holds he is mekadesh her with the hana'ah (benefit) itself, not money that passes from him to her, requiring the loan be due and money in hand.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kidushin 6b concerning a case where a man is mekadesh a woman "with the hana'ah of the loan." The fundamental question is: what exactly is he being mekadesh her with, and why is this not considered ribbis (interest)? Rashi (רש"י)'s position is that the man is mekadesh the woman with the money she would have paid to hire someone else to negotiate an extension of the loan. Critically, according to Rashi, this is not ribbis because the money is not for the extension itself (harvoch zman) but rather for the service of pius—the effort someone would make to try to get the loan extended. The borrower could theoretically pay the lender himself for this service of "thinking about" not collecting, without it being ribbis, since it's payment for a service, not for actual loan extension. This makes it similar to paying a lobbyist or broker. Rashi's approach requires that the money could theoretically go to the mekadesh himself—it must be something he could receive—otherwise he hasn't given her anything and the kiddushin would be invalid.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kidushin 6b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
