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Can a man be mekadesh a woman by forgoing collection of a loan due, giving her extended time to repay? Rashi (רש"י) holds he is mekadesh her with the money she saves by not hiring someone else to negotiate an extension—a service fee, not ribbis. The Raavad holds he is mekadesh her with the hana'ah (benefit) itself, not money that passes from him to her, requiring the loan be due and money in hand.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kidushin 6b concerning a case where a man is mekadesh a woman "with the hana'ah of the loan." The fundamental question is: what exactly is he being mekadesh her with, and why is this not considered ribbis (interest)? Rashi (רש"י)'s position is that the man is mekadesh the woman with the money she would have paid to hire someone else to negotiate an extension of the loan. Critically, according to Rashi, this is not ribbis because the money is not for the extension itself (harvoch zman) but rather for the service of pius—the effort someone would make to try to get the loan extended. The borrower could theoretically pay the lender himself for this service of "thinking about" not collecting, without it being ribbis, since it's payment for a service, not for actual loan extension. This makes it similar to paying a lobbyist or broker. Rashi's approach requires that the money could theoretically go to the mekadesh himself—it must be something he could receive—otherwise he hasn't given her anything and the kiddushin would be invalid.
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Kidushin 6b
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