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If duress prevents a husband from returning by the date specified in a conditional get, does the divorce still take effect? The shiur develops Rashi (רש"י)'s principle that duress invalidates conditional divorces by making it as if the preventing event never occurred, rather than merely excusing non-performance.
This shiur provides an extensive analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 2a regarding the principle of ein oines bigitin (there is no duress in divorces). The discussion centers on a case where a husband gives his wife a conditional get, stating that if he doesn't return by a certain date, she will be divorced. When duress prevents his return, the question arises whether the divorce takes effect. Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation is examined in detail. He explains that midiraysa (from Torah (תורה) law), duress does invalidate such conditional divorces, deriving this principle from the case of a na'arah me'orasah (betrothed maiden) who cannot be punished if violated under duress. The shiur explores Rashi's language of 'tainas oines' (claim of duress) and questions why he uses this terminology rather than simply stating that duress exempts.
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Kesubos 2a
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