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Does every shevuah require mentioning Hashem (ה׳)'s name explicitly? The Ran and Rabbeinu Tam fundamentally disagree: the Ran holds no shevuah needs a shem at all, while Rabbeinu Tam maintains every shevuah requires a shem—except where the principle of yad (partial statement) applies in shevuah mipi atzmo cases. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position introduces a third approach regarding shevuas bitui.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of a fundamental machlokes Rishonim regarding the requirement of mentioning Hashem (ה׳)'s name (shem) in various categories of shevuos (oaths). The core dispute centers on Rabbeinu Tam's innovative distinction between shevuah mipi atzmo (self-initiated oath) and shevuah mipi acher (oath initiated by another party). Rabbeinu Tam's position is that the requirement of shem varies based on who initiates the shevuah. When one is responding to another's shevuah initiation (mipi acher)—such as in shevuas eidus or shevuas hapikadon—a shem is required. However, when one initiates the shevuah oneself (mipi atzmo), no shem is technically needed because the principle of yad applies. The Ran raises a powerful challenge: the Gemara (גמרא) learns shevuas eidus from sotah, and by sotah, the woman's amen is considered as if she said the full shevuah herself (mipi atzmo). If so, why would shevuas eidus require a shem specifically in the mipi acher case, when the source (sotah) is mipi atzmo?
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Nedarim
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What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
