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Why can't a king testify in Jewish law? The Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguishes two separate halachos: mideoraisa, a king is not *obligated* to testify (eino chayav lehoi'ot)—but he may if he wishes. Chazal added a rabbinic disqualification for a Melech Yisrael alone: he is *pasul* from testifying due to intimidation. This framework resolves major contradictions in the Rambam and explains the Gemara (גמרא)'s kal vachomer.
Rabbi Zweig undertakes a thorough analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings on testimony by a king, revealing a fundamental distinction that resolves numerous apparent contradictions. The shiur centers on the question: what is the Torah (תורה) law regarding a king's ability to serve as a witness, and what did Chazal add? The Rambam states in Hilchos Eidus that a Kohen Gadol who knows testimony "eino chayav lehoi'ot"—is not obligated to come testify. Likewise, a king is not obligated to testify. Rabbi Zweig emphasizes that this language—"eino chayav"—does not mean "pasul" (disqualified). Mideoraisa, a king is not *required* to testify, but he is *permitted* to testify if he wishes. This is not a disqualification; it is an exemption from the obligation, rooted in kavod hamelech (the honor of the king). The king need not leave his responsibilities and subordinate himself by traveling to beis din.
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Yoma 74a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
