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Why does Kiddushin require the din of Eved Kenani when we already have the parsha of zechiyah (acquiring on behalf of another)? The shiur explores three approaches: that Kiddushin isn't a pure zechus, that the chassan must actively perform the kinyan (not just passively receive), or that Eved Kenani creates the chiddush that the money given becomes "as if" the chassan gave it himself. A fundamental tension emerges: the Ran suggests Eved Kenani may not even apply to dinei mamonos.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 7a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s teaching that one can be mekadesh a woman for another man through the din of Eved Kenani (the law of acquiring a Canaanite slave for someone else). The fundamental question driving the entire discussion is: what does the din of Eved Kenani add to Kiddushin that isn't already covered by the general principle of zechiyah lo adam shelo befanav (acquiring something on behalf of another person)? Rabbi Zweig presents three possible approaches to resolve this question. First, citing Yirmi's point, perhaps Kiddushin is not necessarily a zechus (benefit). While it seems obvious that marriage is beneficial, perhaps we cannot simply assume this, and therefore the general din of zechiyah wouldn't apply without the specific teaching of Eved Kenani. The Avnei Miluim discusses whether one could be mekadesh someone for a katan (minor), which raises similar questions about whether marriage is automatically considered a benefit.
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Kiddushin 7a
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