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Why can't we learn kofer liability from bor when Gemara (גמרא) says we can learn regel from keren? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: kofer is not tashlumin for damage but kapara for chiyuv misa b'dei shamayim. This explains why muad for behema creates kofer liability (Rambam (רמב"ם) Perek 6) even though muad l'behema isn't muad l'adam for nezikin — kofer requires only peshiya b'shmira, not creating a mazik.
The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות)'s famous question on Bava Kamma 9b: the Gemara (גמרא) wants to establish that there is kofer liability by regel by learning it from keren, even though there's a pircha of "mah l'keren she'kein kavanas l'hazik." Yet earlier, the Gemara rejected learning kofer for bor from shor precisely because of the pircha "mah l'shor she'kein ba'achala." Why doesn't the same pircha apply when learning regel from keren? Tosafos leaves this with a teiku. Rabbi Zweig then addresses the Marsha's question on another Tosafos. That Tosafos asks why we need the drasha of "shor v'lo adam" to exclude an adam from kofer liability for bor when we already have "alav v'lo ya'aleh bor" and "alav v'lo ya'aleh eish" to teach that only shor is mechayev kofer. The Marsha challenges: how could Tosafos ever think to learn kofer from shor to bor when "nafkom shor v'lo adam" already excludes it? The Marsha suggests Tosafos is really asking about eish, not bor, though this reading is difficult.
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Bava Kamma 9b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
