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Why can't we learn kofer liability from bor when Gemara (גמרא) says we can learn regel from keren? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: kofer is not tashlumin for damage but kapara for chiyuv misa b'dei shamayim. This explains why muad for behema creates kofer liability (Rambam (רמב"ם) Perek 6) even though muad l'behema isn't muad l'adam for nezikin — kofer requires only peshiya b'shmira, not creating a mazik.
The shiur opens with Tosafos (תוספות)'s famous question on Bava Kamma 9b: the Gemara (גמרא) wants to establish that there is kofer liability by regel by learning it from keren, even though there's a pircha of "mah l'keren she'kein kavanas l'hazik." Yet earlier, the Gemara rejected learning kofer for bor from shor precisely because of the pircha "mah l'shor she'kein ba'achala." Why doesn't the same pircha apply when learning regel from keren? Tosafos leaves this with a teiku. Rabbi Zweig then addresses the Marsha's question on another Tosafos. That Tosafos asks why we need the drasha of "shor v'lo adam" to exclude an adam from kofer liability for bor when we already have "alav v'lo ya'aleh bor" and "alav v'lo ya'aleh eish" to teach that only shor is mechayev kofer. The Marsha challenges: how could Tosafos ever think to learn kofer from shor to bor when "nafkom shor v'lo adam" already excludes it? The Marsha suggests Tosafos is really asking about eish, not bor, though this reading is difficult.
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Bava Kamma 9b
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