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When a stolen animal (klei) gives birth (becomes ayin), who owns the klei and who owns the ayin? The shiur contrasts three views: Rashi (רש"י) holds the ganav owns only the ayin while the nignav retains the klei; the Rosh holds the ganav owns both through shinui Hashem (ה׳); the Rambam (רמב"ם) holds the ganav owns the ayin and this kinyan extends to the klei as well, creating a distinct din between hilchos geneivah and gezeilah regarding when keifel is paid.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 55b, focusing on the fundamental dispute among the Rishonim concerning the nature of ownership when a stolen pregnant animal gives birth. The central question is whether the ganav (thief) acquires only the ayin (the offspring) or also retains ownership of the klei (the original stolen vessel/animal). The shiur begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s position, which holds that the ganav is koneh (acquires ownership) only of the ayin, while the klei remains the property of the nignav (the victim). According to this understanding, since the nignav still owns the klei, the ganav must pay keren (principal) plus the increased value of the animal. This creates what the Shitah Mekubetzes considers a difficult question: if the klei still belongs to the nignav, how can the ganav be required to pay anything beyond returning the klei itself?
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Bava Kamma 55b
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