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Does lo titgodedu apply when different communities pasken differently, or only when their observable practices diverge within one city? The shiur develops the fundamental distinction: if lo titgodedu governs psak halacha (הלכה), two cities may not differ; if it governs hanhaga (observable practice), two cities may differ, but one city may not. This chakira illuminates the Gemara (גמרא)'s shift from amud beis to amud alef and has major implications for whether minhagim trigger lo titgodedu.
This shiur analyzes Yevamos 13b-14a, focusing on the sugya of lo titgodedu and the Gemara (גמרא)'s evolving understanding of when the prohibition applies. The discussion opens with unresolved questions from the previous shiur about Rashi (רש"י)'s position on whether the kashya changes from three zmanim (reading times for Megillah on the 11th, 14th, and 15th) to two zmanim, and what role minhag plays in that shift. The Gemara's progression moves from an initial question of lo titgodedu raised by Reish Lakish regarding Megillah readings, through Rabbi Yochanan's challenge about makom shenagu (where they observed certain practices), to the more fundamental case of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel's disagreement about tzaras ha'ach (permitting a yavam to marry his brother's wife's co-wife). The key turn comes when the Gemara distinguishes between minhag (custom) and din (law), suggesting initially that lo titgodedu does not apply to mere minhag.
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Yevamos 13b-14a
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