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When a bechor turns thirteen without having received pidyon haben, does he now have his own mitzvah (מצוה), or does he merely take over his father's unfulfilled obligation? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds there is no new mitzvah—the adult is simply finishing the father's chiyuv—whereas the Rashba treats it as a new obligation at bar mitzvah. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of mil meshubad reveals this fundamental distinction.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a and the unique nature of pidyon haben when the obligation shifts from father to son. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether a mother is obligated in pidyon haben, and Rashi (רש"י) explains that it is not a mitzvah (מצוה) she'zman grama because the thirty-day period is not a time limit but rather establishes when the child becomes a bar kayama (viable). The chiyuv applies only to a viable child, so there is no time-bound element until viability is established. The shiur distinguishes between milah and pidyon haben. By milah, Rashi does not need to address why a woman is exempt despite its being a mitzvah she'zman grama, because according to Tosfos in Megillah, milah has a special chumra—it is one of the three brisos and has the status of mitzvah she'yesh bo kores—which overrides the exemption. By pidyon haben, no such chumra exists, so Rashi must explain why it is not mitzvah she'zman grama: the thirty-day requirement reflects the need for viability, not a time-bound obligation.
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Kiddushin 29a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
