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When a bechor turns thirteen without having received pidyon haben, does he now have his own mitzvah (מצוה), or does he merely take over his father's unfulfilled obligation? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds there is no new mitzvah—the adult is simply finishing the father's chiyuv—whereas the Rashba treats it as a new obligation at bar mitzvah. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of mil meshubad reveals this fundamental distinction.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a and the unique nature of pidyon haben when the obligation shifts from father to son. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether a mother is obligated in pidyon haben, and Rashi (רש"י) explains that it is not a mitzvah (מצוה) she'zman grama because the thirty-day period is not a time limit but rather establishes when the child becomes a bar kayama (viable). The chiyuv applies only to a viable child, so there is no time-bound element until viability is established. The shiur distinguishes between milah and pidyon haben. By milah, Rashi does not need to address why a woman is exempt despite its being a mitzvah she'zman grama, because according to Tosfos in Megillah, milah has a special chumra—it is one of the three brisos and has the status of mitzvah she'yesh bo kores—which overrides the exemption. By pidyon haben, no such chumra exists, so Rashi must explain why it is not mitzvah she'zman grama: the thirty-day requirement reflects the need for viability, not a time-bound obligation.
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Kiddushin 29a
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