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When is a person liable for damage caused by an ox given to a shoteh (mentally incompetent person) or katan (minor)? The shiur analyzes the dispute between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish, exploring whether giving to a shoteh/katan constitutes negligence in guarding or whether it creates the damage itself. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot offer fundamentally different frameworks for understanding the legal responsibility.
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Bava Kamma 9b, focusing on the dispute between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding liability when one gives a guarded animal (shor kosher) or fire (gacheles/shalheves) to a shoteh (mentally incompetent person) or katan (minor), and damage subsequently occurs. The Gemara (גמרא)'s foundational question centers on the nature of the liability: Is one liable because of negligent guarding (peshiya in shemirah), or because one's action caused the damage (ma'aseh hezeq)? The shiur explores the concept of "derech le'natukei" — the natural tendency of an ox to break free — and how this relates to the requirement of proper guarding.
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Bava Kamma 9b
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