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When witnesses are later disqualified, from when are they considered pasul—retroactively or only going forward? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between eidim zomemim (witnesses proven false through hazamah) and witnesses disqualified for other reasons. The shiur develops the chiddush that pesul l'kukas (retroactive disqualification) applies only when one relied on beis din's acceptance of their testimony, creating a unique protection for those who acted based on judicial determination.
The shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 62b-63a, focusing on the fundamental question of when disqualified witnesses are considered pasul. The central machlokes in the Gemara (גמרא) concerns whether witnesses who are later proven to be eidim zomemim are disqualified retroactively (mei'ikara) or only from the time the hazamah occurred (mikan u'l'haba). Rabbi Zweig presents the Gemara's question: what is the difference between the first and second explanations in the Gemara regarding when eidim zomemim are disqualified? According to the first approach, all eidus is possible to be disqualified retroactively except for eidim zomemim, which are only disqualified going forward. According to the second approach, all eidus—including eidim zomemim—is only disqualified mikan u'l'haba. This creates a fundamental difficulty: what substantive difference exists between these two positions?
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Bava Kamma 62b-63a
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