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When money is given "al menas lehachzir" (on condition to return), does it work for kiddushin or sale without a tenai kaful? The shiur develops that even without tenai kaful, the recipient remains obligated to return the money, though the kinyan itself remains valid. This creates a fundamental distinction between the obligation to return and the reversal of the kinyan.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of "matan al menas lehachzir" (giving with the expectation of return) and its relationship to the laws of tenai kaful (double-sided condition). The central issue is whether kiddushin, sale, or fulfillment of mitzvos can be effectuated when money or an object is given with the expectation that it will be returned. The shiur begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות)' question: why doesn't the Gemara immediately ask that there is no tenai kaful in the case of the esrog? A tenai kaful requires explicit statement of both outcomes: "if such-and-such happens, then X; if not, then not-X." Here, there is only a one-sided condition. Tosafos answers that by esrog it's so clear (umdenah de-muchach) that the giver only wants to be yotzei the mitzvah (מצוה) and get it back, that you don't need a formal tenai kaful. The shiur questions whether this logic extends to other cases like kiddushin or mecher.
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Kiddushin 6b
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