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Can you violate Yom Kippur by consuming something in an unusual way? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י)'s position that liability depends on derech achilah (normal manner of eating) with the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s view that anything edible—even consumed abnormally—creates liability. The distinction emerges from how each reads the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of vinegar, spices, and ginger on Yom Kippur.
This advanced shiur analyzes Yoma 81b, focusing on the fundamental question of what creates liability on Yom Kippur when foods are consumed in an unusual manner (shelo k'derech achilah). The discussion centers on the Gemara (גמרא)'s treatment of spices (papalin), ginger (zangvil), and vinegar (chometz), and the profound disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the principle of yishuv ha-daas (satisfaction/settling of mind). Rabbi Zweig begins with the Gemara's statement that one who eats papalin (peppers) on Yom Kippur in an unusual manner is not liable. Rashi explains this is because there is no derech achilah—no normal manner of eating it that way—and therefore no yishuv ha-daas. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the laws of orlah: if papalin is not considered food when eaten whole, how can it be subject to orlah, which only applies to fruit trees? Rashi answers that the distinction is between wet (rotuv) and dry (yavesh) forms. When wet, papalin can be eaten whole and is considered food; when dry, it is ground as a spice and is not eaten in a normal manner.
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Yoma 81b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
