No community start suggestion yet.
Why does kinyan chalipin (barter) not work for kiddushin? The shiur analyzes Tosafot's position that chalipin functions through gemirus das (meeting of minds) rather than genuine obligation, making it invalid for creating the unique halachic status of marriage. Unlike regular kesef which effects true transfer, chalipin only manifests agreement.
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of Tosafot on Kiddushin 3a regarding why kinyan chalipin does not work for kiddushin. The central question is how to understand Tosafot's statement that chalipin is a "kinyan acher" (different kinyan) and why the Gemara (גמרא)'s maskana says "isha b'pach mi'sheha pruta lo nikneh" (a woman cannot be acquired with less than a sheva pruta). Rabbi Zweig addresses several key kashas (difficulties). The Maharshal's kasha asks why the maskona can ask from shetar but not from chazakah. The Ran's kasha questions what the Gemara means by "isha b'pach mi'sheha pruta lo nikneh" - the Gemara should simply say there's no gezeiras shavah and therefore chalipin doesn't work. Another difficulty is that according to Tosafot, even in the havamina the Gemara only understood chalipin to work with a sheva pruta, so what was the difference between the havamina and maskona?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 3a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
