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What is the source of the mother's obligation in milah, and what is the scope of the bezdin's responsibility? The shiur argues that without a pasuk, both mother and father would be equally obligated—the Gemara (גמרא) needs "oso v'lo oso" to exempt the mother only when the father is present. This reading challenges the assumption that milah is automatically a time-bound mitzvah (מצוה) for women and explores when bezdin's obligation becomes active.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a's discussion of who bears the obligation of milah—father, mother, or bezdin (the Jewish community). Rabbi Zweig corrects his previous position: he now argues that Rashi (רש"י) understands the mother's obligation as stemming not from the general bezdin obligation but from the same parental obligation as the father. The Gemara (גמרא)'s need for a pasuk to exempt the mother implies that without the pasuk, if the father is obligated, the mother would be as well. This is not a case of deriving the mother's obligation from the bezdin category; rather, it reflects an original parental joint obligation. The shiur brings support from the Maha'rach Or Zarua, a Rishon who explicitly rules that if there is no father, the mother is obligated in milah. This position, previously considered marginal, now appears to be the straightforward reading of the Gemara. The pasuk "oso v'lo oso" does not exempt women categorically; it exempts the mother only in the presence of the father. This is akin to saying the father has precedence, not that the mother has no obligation at all.
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Kiddushin 29a
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