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When can a minor be converted against his future will? The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether ger katan magbilin oso al das beis din creates a permanent conversion or allows for rejection upon reaching majority. Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that parents must bring the child raises questions about the scope of zachin adam shelo b'fanav and its application to gerus d'rabanan.
The shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kesubos 11a dealing with the conversion of minors (ger katan). The central issue is the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that 'ger katan magbilin oso al das beis din' - a minor convert is immersed based on the authority of beis din. This raises fundamental questions about the principle of zachin adam shelo b'fanav (we may act for someone's benefit in his absence) and how it applies to conversion. Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary presents several difficulties. He states that if there is no father, the mother brings him to convert (im ein lo av imo hevi otah l'gayer), implying that parental involvement is necessary. However, this creates a contradiction with the later Gemara's discussion of higdil yachol limchos (when he matures he can protest), where Rashi maintains this applies even when parents convert together with children. If parental authority negates the need for zachin, why would protest be possible when parents are involved?
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Kesubos 11a
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