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Why can a baby be killed to save its mother while inside the womb, but not once its head emerges? The shiur develops Rav Chaim's distinction between din rodef (killing isn't murder) and chiyuv rodef (obligation to kill), showing how both apply inside but only din rodef applies outside.
This shiur analyzes one of the most challenging passages in Sanhedrin 72b regarding the halachos of ein dochin nefesh mipnei nefesh (we don't push away one life for another). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a baby is being born and threatens the mother's life - while inside, the baby may be killed to save the mother, but once the head emerges, it cannot be killed since ein dochin nefesh mipnei nefesh. The Gemara explains this with the phrase mishamayim kara'tila (from Heaven it was decreed). Rashi (רש"י) learns that inside, the baby is not yet a nefesh, so there's no problem of killing one person for another. Once outside, it becomes a nefesh, creating the prohibition. The Rambam (רמב"ם) presents a radically different approach, stating that inside the womb, the baby is considered a rodef (pursuer) trying to kill the mother, which is why it may be killed. Once outside, ein dochin nefesh mipnei nefesh applies, described as zeh tiv'o shel olam (this is the nature of the world). This raises fundamental questions: Why does the Rambam invoke din rodef when killing an unborn baby should be permissible simply because it's not yet a nefesh? How does the Rambam understand mishamayim kara'tila if he maintains the baby is a rodef? What's the essential difference between inside and outside if both involve rodef status?
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Sanhedrin 72b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
