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Can a man be mashlem (complete) kiddushin later when he gave less than the promised amount? The shiur distinguishes between mona stam (unspecified amount) and mona zu (this specific amount). When you say mona stam and give a dinar, there's an implied promise to complete—the woman trusts you'll deliver, so she agrees to kiddushin. But mona zu with ninety-nine coins creates no promise, and the kiddushin fails entirely.
This shiur on Kiddushin 3b addresses fundamental questions about when kiddushin takes effect when a man promises one amount (a "mona") but delivers a different amount. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion centers on whether the kiddushin is chal (takes effect) immediately or only when the full amount is delivered, and whether the man can later be mashlem (complete the kiddushin) if he initially gave less than promised. The shiur opens by examining Tosfos's approach to the Gemara's kal vachomer argument. Tosfos argues from the Reisha (first clause) that if kiddushin is not chal until the end, then certainly you don't need the entire Sefer (second clause) to establish this principle. However, Rabbi Zweig raises several kashas on Tosfos. First, even if the Reisha discusses mona zu (this specific amount), the same question applies—if it's not chal until later by mona zu in the Reisha, then in the Sefer you also wouldn't be mekudeshes. The kal vachomer would work either way. Second, what purpose does "mona v'holech" (ongoing amount) serve in the Reisha if we're talking about mona zu? The same din would apply without mona v'holech.
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Kiddushin 3b
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