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When a man uses ambiguous language like "harei at tzarosi" (you are my bundle) for kiddushin, is it valid? The Gemara (גמרא)'s question assumes asukin b'oso inyan—discussing marriage beforehand. The shiur explores whether asukin provides certainty of her consent or whether ambiguous terms create a safek retraction from clearer language said earlier, analyzing when silence creates halachic assent.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of ambiguous language in kiddushin and the concept of asukin b'oso inyan (engaged in discussing that matter). The Gemara asks whether phrases like "harei at tzarosi" (you are my bundle) or other unclear terms constitute valid kiddushin language. The core question emerges: Why does the Gemara frame this as a safek (doubt)? If we pasken like Rav Yosi that asukin b'oso inyan doesn't require explicit language, the kiddushin should be valid. But if the halacha (הלכה) were like Rav Yehuda requiring explicit statement, there would be no question—it wouldn't work. The Avnei Miluim asks: if asukin b'oso inyan establishes that both parties want marriage (like Rabbah holds), why doesn't the Gemara simply say they were asukin, making even "tzarosi" valid? Why introduce the problem of omrim lo l'melacha (perhaps he means work, not marriage)?
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Kiddushin 6a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
